hope in our 2008 article Federal Search Commission, which compared dominant search engines to railroads and common carriers in the hope that they would be recognized as infrastructural foundations of the information economy. 5 But I now see that Federal Search Commission, like many other parts of the search engine accountability literature, tried too hard to shoehorn a wide variety of social concerns about search engines into the economic language of antitrust policy. 6 It is now time for scholars and activists to move beyond the crabbed vocabulary of competition law to develop a richer normative critique of search engine dominance.
This will not be an easy sell in cyberlaw, which tends to uncritically promote competition and innovation as the highest aims of Internet policy. If a dominant search engine is abusing its position, market-oriented scholars say, market forces will usually solve the problem, and antitrust law can step in when they fail to do so. Even those who favor net neutrality rules for carriers are wary of applying them to other intermediaries, like search engines. All tend to assume that the more "innovation" happens on the Internet, the more choices users will have and the more efficient the market will become. Yet these scholars have not paid enough attention to the kind of innovation that is best for society, and whether the uncoordinated preferences of millions of web users for low-cost convenience are likely to address the cultural and political concerns that dominant search engines raise.
In this article, I hope to demonstrate two points. First, antitrust law terms (like "essential facility") cannot hope to capture the complexity of concerns raised by an information landscape where one company serves as the predominant map of the web, and simultaneously attempts to exploit that dominance by endlessly expanding into adjoining fields. Second, I hope to point the way toward a new concept of "essential cultural and political facility," which can help policymakers realize the situations where a bottleneck has become important enough that special scrutiny is warranted. This scrutiny may not always lead to regulationwhich the First Amendment renders a dicey enterprise in any corner of the information economy. However, it could lead us to recognize the importance of publicly funded alternatives to the concentrated conduits and contentproviders colonizing the web. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) ("Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today-whether as litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic, or informed observer-not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of specific business practices with that goal.").
The Limits of Antitrust as Search Policy
Antitrust cases tend to consume a great deal of time, in part because economic conduct is subject to many different interpretations. 7 One person's anticompetitive conduct is another's effective business strategy. The same unending (and indeterminate) arguments threaten to stall discourse on search policy. For example, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) review of the Google-DoubleClick merger focused almost entirely on the economic effects of the proposed combination, rather than the threats to privacy it posed. 8 Search engines are among the most innovative services in the global economy. They provide extraordinary efficiencies for advertisers and consumers by targeting messages to viewers who are most likely to want to receive them. In order to attract more users, search engines use revenues from advertising to organize and index a great deal of content on the Internet. Like the major broadcast networks, search engines are now beginning to displace. They provide opportunities to view content (organic search results) in order to sell advertising (paid search results). 9 Search engines have provoked antitrust scrutiny because proposed deals between major search engines (and between search engines and content providers) suggest undue coordination of competitors in an already concentrated industry. The technology environment moves at a lightning pace, and by the time a federal case has been made out of a problem, the problem is proven, a remedy fashioned, and appeals exhausted, the damage may already be irreversible."). .. wrote that 'as the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition,' the FTC lacks the legal authority to block the transaction on grounds, or require conditions to this transaction, that do not relate to antitrust. Adding, however, that it takes consumer privacy issues very seriously, the Commission cross-referenced its release of a set of proposed behavioral marketing principles that were also announced today.").
9
According to the Google corporate home page, "[W]e distinguish ads from search results or other content on a page by labeling them as 'sponsored links' or 'Ads by Google.' We don't sell ad placement in our search results, nor do we allow people to pay for a higher ranking there." Google, Inc., Those opposed to regulation often claim that antitrust law offers a more targeted and efficient response to abuses. As Justice Breyer explained in his classic work Regulation and Its Reform:
[T]he antitrust laws differ from classical regulation both in their aims and in their methods … .
[T]hey act negatively, through a few highly general provisions prohibiting certain forms of private conduct. They do not affirmatively order firms to behave in specified ways; for the most part, they tell private firms what not to do … . Only rarely do the antitrust enforcement agencies create the detailed web of affirmative legal obligations that characterizes classical regulation. 11 Given the lack of search engine regulation in the U.S., actual and threatened antitrust investigations have been a primary government influence on Google's business practices as its dominance in search grows. Many believe that the Department of Justice's (DOJ) suspicion of the company's proposed joint venture with Yahoo! in the search advertising field effectively scuttled the deal by late 2008. 12 However, antitrust enforcement appears less promising in other aspects of search. 13 This section discusses the limits of antitrust in addressing the cultural and political dilemmas raised by Google's proposed Book Search deal with publishers, 14 Privacy concerns are nearly impossible to address within the economic models of contemporary competition law. Antitrust scrutiny did little to address the privacy concerns raised when Google proposed to merge with the web advertising firm DoubleClick. 15 The proposed deal provoked a complaint from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). EPIC claimed that Google's modus operandi amounts to a "deceptive trade practice":
Upon arriving at the Google homepage, a Google user is not informed of Google's data collection practices until he or she clicks through four links. Most users will not reach this page … . Google collects user search terms in connection with his or her IP address without adequate notice to the user. Therefore, Google's representations concerning its data retention practices were, and are, deceptive practices. 16 One key question raised by the proposed merger was whether privacy and consumer protection concerns like these can be addressed by traditional antitrust analysis. 17 Privacy law expert Peter Swire argued that they can, because "privacy harms reduce consumer welfare … [and] lead to a reduction in the quality of a good or service." 18 Swire believed that consumers would be worse off after the merger because of the unparalleled digital dossiers the combined entity could generate: "broad" information about an individual's actions, with its leading ability to pinpoint where a person surfs. 19 Initial points of contention include (a) the definition of the products at issue, and (b) how to weigh the costs and benefits of a merger. The combined company would have different segments of "customers" in a two-sided market: 20 (1) searchers trying to find sites, and (2) ad buyers trying to reach searchers. Swire contends that many people care about privacy, and "[i]t would be illogical to count the harms to consumers from higher prices while excluding the harms from privacy invasions-both sorts of harms reduce consumer surplus and consumer welfare in the relevant market." 21 However, the web searcher category not only consists of consumers who care about privacy, but also includes many people who do not highly value it or who actively seek to expose their information in order to receive more targeted solicitations. According to Eric Goldman's work on personalized search, some may even consider the gathering of data about them to be a service. 22 The more information is gathered about them, the better intermediaries are able to serve them relevant ads. Many economic models of web publication assume that users "pay" for content by viewing ads; 23 they may effectively pay less if the advertisements they view bear some relation to things they want to buy. So while Swire models advertising and data collection as a cost to be endured,
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Id. According to Swire, "[i]f the merger is approved, then individuals using the market leader in search may face a search product that has both 'deep' and 'broad' collection of information. For the many millions of individuals with high privacy preferences, this may be a significant reduction in the quality of the search product-search previously was conducted without the combined deep and broad tracking, and now the combination will exist." Id. Google and DoubleClick argue that the resulting personalized ads serve customers.
Their arguments prevailed, and Google officially acquired DoubleClick in 2008. 24 Antitrust law is ill prepared to handle a "market" where some percentage of consumers consider loss of privacy a gain and others consider it a loss. Economic reasoning in general falters in the face of externalities, but usually we can all agree that, say, pollution is a harm (or negative externality) and flowers are a boon (or positive externality). Privacy preferences are much more idiosyncratic.
Critics of the merger do have a response to this problem of diverse preferences-they can shift from characterizing lost privacy as a cost of web searching to describing it as a reduction in the quality of the services offered by the merging entities. 25 Douglas Kysar's work on the product-process distinction is encouraging here. Kysar has claimed that consumers should have a right to make choices of products based on how the products are made, not just how well they work. 26 Kysar argues "in favor of acknowledging and accommodating [consumer] process preferences within policy analysis, given the potential significance that such preferences may serve in the future as outlets for public-minded behavior." 27 Nevertheless, the valuation problems here are daunting. How are we to determine how much consumers are willing to pay to avoid privacy-eroding companies? 28 Perhaps, as Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman suggest in their book Priceless, we should stop even trying to pretend that these decisions can be made on 24 See Press Release, Google Inc., Google Closes Acquisition of DoubleClick (Mar. 11, 2008), available at www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080311_doubleclick.html. 25 Both Supreme Court precedent and DOJ guidelines support this approach. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) ("The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at 30-32 (1997) (efficient market behavior is indicated by lower prices, new products, and "improved quality"). anything approaching a purely economic basis. 29 Engaging in a cost-benefit analysis diminishes privacy's status as a right. Though many scholars have compellingly argued for broader foundations for competition law, the mainstream of contemporary antitrust policy in the United States cannot accommodate such concerns. Antitrust's summum bonum is the maximization of "consumer welfare," and this measure of efficiency is notoriously narrow. 30 For example, the DOJ was hard pressed to adequately factor in a basic democratic commitment to diverse communicative channels during many media mergers. 31 Given antitrust doctrine's pronounced tendency to suppress or elide the cultural and political consequences of concentrated corporate power, the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics within the FTC are ill-equipped to respond to the most compelling issues raised by search engines. 32 The GoogleDoubleclick merger proceedings ultimately ended with an overwhelming win for Google at the FTC. 33 This outcome was all but inevitable given the foundations of contemporary antitrust doctrine, 34 and is the logical outgrowth of overreliance on legal economic theory that uncritically privileges market Id.
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Maurice Stucke describes and critiques this bias in some detail. See Stucke, supra note 30, at 1031 (describing a "mishmash of neoclassical economic theory, vignettes of zero-sum competition, and normative weighing of the anticompetitive ethereal-deadweight welfare loss-against the conjectures of procompetitive efficiencies" at the core of too much antitrust law and theory). Among his many important contributions to the literature, Stucke makes it clear that competition policy includes far more goals and tactics than antitrust enforcement alone. Id. at 987-1008.
outcomes. 35 As long as contemporary doctrine holds that antitrust is singularly focused on the "consumer welfare" a proposed transaction will generate, 36 antitrust policymakers will be unable to address the cultural and political consequences of consolidation in the search industry.
Antitrust challenges to the proposed settlement of a copyright lawsuit by authors and publishers against Google's Book Search program are likely to be similarly constrained. 37 As in the Google-Doubleclick merger, the privacy implications of Google's proposed deal with publishers are profound. 38 Anyone who cares about public input into the future of access to knowledge should approach the potential deal here warily, even if the prospect of constructing a digital Library of Alexandria tempts scholars. 39 As Harvard librarian Robert Darnton has argued, only a naive optimist could ignore the perils of having one profit-driven company effectively entrusted with a comprehensive collection of the world's books. 40 When publishers challenged Google's book scanning in 2007, many hoped that public interest groups could leverage copyright challenges to Google's book search program to promote the public interest. Courts could condition a proGoogle fair use finding on universal access to the contents of the resulting database. Landmark cases like Sony v. Universal 41 set a precedent for taking such broad public interests into account in the course of copyright litigation. 42 Those who opt out of the settlement may be able to fight for such concessions, but for now the battle centers on challenges to the settlement itself.
Both James Grimmelmann and Pamela Samuelson have suggested several principles and recommendations to guide judicial deliberations on the proposed settlement. 43 Grimmelmann's work has focused primarily on antitrust issues, 44 while Samuelson has concentrated on the concerns of academic authors. 45 Grimmelmann has succinctly summarized the settlement's potential threats to innovation and competition in the market for book indices, and books themselves:
The antitrust danger here is that the settlement puts Google in a highly privileged position for book search and book sales. … The authors and publishers settled voluntarily with Google, but there's no guarantee they'll offer similar terms, or any terms at all, to anyone else. … [They] could unilaterally decide only to talk to Google. Grimmelmann proposes several methods of assuring that the publishers will deal with other book search services. 47 Grimmelmann suggests an "[a]ntitrust consent decree" and "[n]ondiscrimination among copyright owners" as potential responses to the issues raised by the settlement. 48 Most of his proposal reflects a policy consensus that presumes competition is the ideal solution to abuses of power online. 49 Yet there are many reasons why competition is unlikely to arise in book search services, even if the settlement is altered in order to promote it. 50 Licensing costs are likely to be a substantial barrier to entry. A key to competition in the search market is having a comprehensive database of searchable materials; the more these materials need to be licensed, the less likely it is that a second comer can set up its own book archive. As scholars have demonstrated, deals like Google's proposed settlement help entrench copyright holders' claims for licensing revenue. 51 Moreover, innovation in search is heavily dependent on having an installed base of users that effectively "train" the search engine to be responsive. 52 The more search queries an engine gets, the better able it is to sharpen and perfect its algorithm. 53 Each additional user tends to decrease the cost of a better quality service for all subsequent users by contributing activity that helps the search engine differentiate between high and low quality organizational strategies. 54 Thus, incumbents with large numbers of users enjoy 47 Id. 48 Grimmelmann, Google Book Search Settlement, supra note 44, at 15.
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Grimmelmann does also propose some revised terms that would not be primarily designed to incentivize the development of new alternatives to Google Book Search; for example, he proposes "[l]ibrary and reader representation at the [Book Rights R]egistry" that would administer many aspects of the settlement. Id. 
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For example, if 100 people search for "alternatives to Microsoft Word software" on a search engine on a given day and all pick the third-ranked result, the search algorithm may adjust itself and put the third-ranked result as the first result the next day. The most-used search engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals. substantial advantages over smaller entrants. Restrictive terms of service also deter competitors who aspire to reverse engineer and develop better versions of such services. 55 In general purpose search, users cannot reproduce, copy, or resell any Google service for any reason, even if the behavior is manual and nondisruptive. 56 Another section proscribes "creat[ing] a derivative work of … the Software." 57 Advertisers face other restrictions, as Google's AdWords Application Programming Interface (API) Terms & Conditions "impede advertisers' efforts to efficiently copy their ad campaigns to other providers." 58 All of these factors militate against robust competition in the comprehensive book search field.
Quantum leaps in technology capable of overcoming these brute disadvantages are unlikely, particularly because search is as much about personalized service as it is about technical principles of information organization and retrieval. 59 Current advantage in search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially given that so many more people are using the services now than when Google overtook other search engines in the early 2000s. 60 What does an online world featuring an entrenched Google Book Search as gatekeeper look like? Initially, it will prove a vast improvement on the status
The Google Story 215 (2005) (noting that the most-used search engine will have more data to tweak its algorithms than its less-used rivals. ). ( 55 Though the precise terms of service of Google Book Search have not been finalized, Google's more general terms of service are not promising. Google's terms of service prohibit any action that "interferes with or disrupts" Google's services, networks, or computers. Google Inc., Terms of Service § 5.4 (Apr. 16, 2007), www.google.com/accounts/TOS. Repeated queries to the service necessary to gather data on its operations may well violate these terms.
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Id. § 5.5.
57
Id. § 10.2. Section 5.3 would proscribe both the automatic data collection and the use of a nonapproved "interface" for accessing Google's database, regardless of the exact means. Id. § 5.3.
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Ben Edelman, PPC Platform Competition and Google's 'May Not Copy' Restriction, June 27, 2008, http://www.benedelman.org/news/062708-1.html (arguing that "Google's restrictions on export and copying of advertisers' campaigns … hinder competition in Internet advertising"). Though the hearing at which Professor Edelman was to testify was cancelled, he has documented these problems in some detail at his website, www.benedelman.org.
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John Battelle, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 8 (2005).at 8 (describing how personalized search enhances the value of search engines to both users and advertisers). Due to trade secrecy, it is impossible for policymakers to discover how much of the intermediary's success is due to its employees' inventive genius, and how much is due to the collective contributions of millions of users to the training of the intermediary's computers. quo of bulky, hard-to-acquire, physical copies of books. But when we consider the ways in which knowledge can be rationed for profit, or structured to promote political ends, some worries arise. Google plans to monetize the book search corpus, and one predictable way of increasing its value is to make parts of it unavailable to those unwilling to pay high licensing fees. If the settlement allowed Google to charge such fees in an unconstrained manner, unmoored from the underlying costs of operating the project, the company would essentially be exploiting a public easement (to copy books) for unlimited private gain. 61 The Open Content Alliance has questioned the restrictive terms of the contracts that Google strikes when it agrees to scan and create a digital database of a library's books. 62 Those restrictive terms foreshadow potential future restrictions on book search services. The proposed deal raises fundamental questions about the proper scope of private initiative in organizing and rationing access to knowledge.
Well-funded libraries may pay a premium to gain access to all sources; lesser institutions may be granted inferior access. If permitted to become prevalent, such tiered access to information could rigidify and reinforce existing inequalities in access to knowledge. 63 Information tiering inequitably disadvantages many groups, promoting the leveraging of wealth into status, educational, or other occupational advantage. Information is not only intrinsically valuable, but also can be a positional good, useful for scoring advantages over others. 64 Admittedly, Google Book Search has so far proven a great resource for scholars. It has made "book learning accessible on a new, worldwide scale, despite the great digital divide that separates the poor from the computerized." 65 Current access to knowledge is stratified in many troubling ways; the works of John Willinsky 66 and Peter Suber 67 identify many troubling current forms of tiering that pale before the present impact of Google Book Search. 68 Given the aggressive pricing strategies of many publishers and content owners, Google Book Search is a vital alternative for scholars.
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee in the current version of the settlement that Google Book Search will preserve its public-regarding features. 69 It may well end up like the powerful "group purchasing organizations" in the American health care system that started promisingly, but have evolved to exploit their intermediary role in troubling ways. 70 Google is more than just one among many online service providers jostling for a competitive edge on the web. It is likely to be the key private entity capable of competing or cooperating with academic publishers and other content providers. Dedicated monitoring and regulation of the settlement terms now could help ensure that book digitization worse off, in some respect, than one would be if that good were distributed equally. So while it might indeed be perverse to advocate leveling down all things considered, leveling down with respect to positional goods benefits absolutely, in some respect, those who would otherwise have less than others. protects privacy, diverse stakeholder interests, and fair pricing of access to knowledge. Alliances between Google Book Search and publishers deserve public scrutiny because they permit private parties to take on what have often been public functions of determining access to and pricing of information. Where "regulatory copyright" 71 has answered such questions with compulsory licenses, 72 the new alliances aspire to put into place a regime of crosssubsidization resistant to public scrutiny or input. 73 Given the vital public interests at stake in the development of this information infrastructure, monitoring is vital. 74 Extant law provides little assurance that it will actually occur.
A Public Alternative?
In other work, I have proposed a number of regulations that would permit either government or public accountability groups to monitor search engines to detect abuses of their dominant position. To conclude this piece, I would like to raise one other alternative: a publicly funded search engine.
To the extent that search engines resist monitoring and accountability, governments should consider establishing public alternatives to them. Here, lessons from recent debates over health insurance may be instructive. There are structural parallels between the intermediary role of private health insurers (which stand as a gatekeeper between patients and providers of health products and services) and that of search engines (which stand between searchers and providers of information). The 1965 decision to establish Medicare as a public option for an elderly population ill-served by private providers and insurers may prove a model for an information economy plagued by persistent digital divides.
As the United States debated health reform from 2009 to 2010, there was a tension between regulation-focused approaches (which would require revelation and alteration of private insurers' unfair practices) and a public option that would compete with existing insurers. Democrats ultimately gave up on pushing the public option, but the debate exposed the many positive aspects a state-sponsored alternative can provide in certain markets. A public option could play a role in search parallel to the role that Medicare plays in the health system: guaranteeing some baseline of transparency in pricing and evaluation. 75 The recent Google Book Search settlement negotiations have led Siva Vaidhyanathan to characterize Google's archive project as evidence of a "public failure." 76 Whereas government intervention is often necessary in cases of "market failure," Vaidhyanathan argues that the reverse can occur: market actors can step into a vacuum where government should have been. In the case of digitized books, the problem is presented starkly: Why has the Library of Congress failed to require digital deposit of books, instead of merely accepting paper copies? We can debate when such a requirement became plausible; however, had the government required such deposit as soon as it became feasible, the problematic possibility of a Google monopoly here would be much less troubling. If digital deposit ever is adopted, the government could license its corpus to alternative search services. There is no good reason why the company that is best capable of reproducing books (and settling lawsuits based on that reproduction) should have a monopoly on search technologies used to organize and distribute them.
More ambitiously, an NGO or quasi-administrative NGO could undertake to index and archive the web, licensing opportunities to search and organize it to various entities that promise to maintain open standards for ranking and rating websites and other Internet presences. 77 Wikipedia, Slashdot, and eBay all 75 suggest methods of evaluating relevance and authority that could be employed by public, open search engines. If such a search engine became at least somewhat popular (or popular within a given niche), it could provide an important alternative source of information and metadata on ranking processes.
The need for a public option in search becomes even more apparent when we consider the waste and inefficiency caused by opaque intermediaries in other fields. Like private health insurers, Google is a middleman, standing between consumers and producers of knowledge. In programs like Book Search, it will effectively collaborate with copyright owners to determine what access people get, how much they have to pay, and on what terms. In the health field, providers and private insurers are both very concentrated in the U.S., and consumers (i.e., the businesses and individuals who buy insurance plans) are not. Insurers and providers also jealously guard the secrecy of many pricing decisions. 78 That is one key reason why the U.S. spends so much more on health care than other industrialized nations, without getting consistently better results, access, or quality.
Health care reformers often split into two camps: those who believe that regulation of middlemen like insurers can bring about fair results, and those who believe that only a public option can serve as a benchmark for judging the behavior of private insurers. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 decisively opted for the regulatory option, and the early stages of its implementation have been rocky. The constitutional challenges to search engine regulation would likely prove more serious than the many lawsuits now attacking PPACA. Therefore, even if the public option in health care is off the table now, it should inspire future proposals in information policy, where regulation of intermediaries may be even more difficult than it has proven to be in health care. If search engines consistently block or frustrate measures to increase their accountability, public alternatives could prove to be an indispensable foundation of a fair, just, and open information environment. 5334%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=IWZYTJbaCoKC8gapvY2xCw&usg=AFQ jCNHdTPpTBUuNHZhTOZtGaRiVKP6C4g&sig2=9aoaKLXiXOOUuYHMewopV Q (describing the value of a Portuguese-oriented search engine); JEAN NOEL JENNENY, GOOGLE AND THE MYTH OF UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE: A VIEW FROM EUROPE (Univ. of Chicago Press 2007). Whereas these authors believe that English-language bias is a particularly problematic aspect of Google's hegemony in the field, I argue that the possibility of many kinds of hidden bias counsel in favor of at least one robust, publicly funded alternative. 
